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Abstract 
Using linked private sector employer-employee panel data for Britain and Norway we 
explore the effects of unionization on workplace closure and employment growth over the 
period 1997-2004. Unions prolonged the life of low-wage workplaces in Britain, whereas 
Norwegian unions increased (reduced) closure hazards in high (low) waged workplaces. 
Contrary to earlier studies, unions had no effect on workplace growth in Britain. In Norway, 
union workplaces experienced 4 percent per annum lower growth. However, the estimation of 
a dynamic panel data model for Norway indicates positive long-term causal effects of union 
density on employment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Britain and Norway are both advanced European industrial economies but they differ along a 
number of dimensions. According to Esping-Andersen’s (1999) classification, Britain is a typical 
liberal regime, while Norway is squarely located in the social-democratic tradition. Wage 
dispersion in Britain is high and widening due, in part, to relatively low and diminishing 
unionisation (Card, Lemieux and Riddell, 2003; Bryson and Forth, 2006). Norway, on the other 
hand, is characterised by very low wage dispersion, high levels of unionisation and a high level of 
coordination in wage setting.1 Thus Britain and Norway are near-opposites in terms of what 
unions do and how they are traditionally treated. This paper exploits these differences in the 
nature of unionization in Britain and Norway to further understanding of union effects on the 
workplace, an understanding that, until recently, was based almost exclusively on studies for 
Anglo-American countries. We do so by assessing the impact of unionisation on workplace 
closure and growth from 1997 to 2004.  
 Several authors have noted the diminishing role of unions in the British economy during 
the 1980s and 1990s (Millward et al., 2000; Brown et al, 1998, 2000), where firm decisions are 
increasingly taken without their involvement (Cully et al., 1999:110, 207; Brown et al., 2000: 616-
19). During the period we consider, private sector unionization continued to decline (Kersley et 
al., 2006; Table 1).  Where unions remained in place they had less impact than in the past 
(Menezes-Filho, 1997; Bryson and Wilkinson, 2002; Blanchflower and Bryson, 2008).2.  For 
instance, the union wage premium, which traditionally hovers around 10 percent, has been nearly 
halved since the 1990s (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003; Blanchflower and Bryson, 2007). 
However, the rate of union decline may have levelled off recently, at least in some industries. In 
1999 the Labour government strengthened unions’ position by introducing the Employment 
Relations Act, which mandates union recognition if the majority of the workforce wants it. This 
may have contributed to a diminution in the rate of union decline and even some evidence of a 
net growth in union recognition (Gall, 2004; Blanden et al. 2007). But the overall impression is 
that, whereas union decline has slowed it has not been reversed: there have been no major 
changes in union fortunes over the last decade (Bryson, 2007).  
 Compared to Britain there has been little change in Norwegian unionisation which 
remains at a high level relative to other European countries. Union density in Norway remained 
                                                 
1 In Wallerstein (1999)’s ranking of wage setting centralisation Norway ranks at the top, while the UK ranks third 
from the bottom (above Canada and the USA).   
2 A firm recognising unions in 1984 could expect to see its profitability drop by 41 percent, while this negative 
impact had become negligible by 1990 (Menezes-Filho, 1997).  
unchanged between the 1950s and mid-1990s (around 57%), and then the following decade 
brought only a small reduction to 52 percent (Stokke et al., 2003; Nergaard and Stokke, 2005, 
2007). This level of union density is considerably lower than in the other Nordic countries. 
Nergaard and Stokke (2007) attribute this to the fact that unemployment and social insurance in 
Norway are provided independent of union membership. Employer associations and worker 
unions gained influence after the Norwegian recession during the late 1980s, and the cooperation 
between employer associations and worker unions delivered low nominal wage growth during the 
period 1988-97 (Stokke et al., 2003:178; Nergaard and Stokke, 2005).3 Over the period we 
consider closure and growth, over 70 percent of the private sector workplaces had union workers 
and union agreements, though there was a downward drift in unionization (Table 1). The union 
membership wage premium in the private sector was small but unchanged.4 There are two main 
changes which affected coordinated wage setting in Norway during the 1990s. First, one observes 
a decentralisation of wage bargaining resulting in an increased prevalence of localised wage 
bargaining. In 1989 53 percent of workplaces were involved in local bargaining. In 2003 this had 
increased to about 70 percent.5 Second, employer collective organisation increased markedly. The 
percentage of private sector employers organised in employers’ associations rose from 57 percent 
in 1989 to 70 percent in 2003. 
 This is the background for our comparative study of the relationship between unions, 
workplace closures and workplace employment growth. Both the impact of unions on closure 
and the impact of unions on growth are theoretically ambiguous. We will discuss these theories in 
the next section. For now, note that while the classical interpretation of unions is that they 
increase wages and thus lower profitability, union voice theories imply that unions engender 
cooperation between employers and workers thus improving productivity. Empirically the impact 
of unions on closures appears to be time and country-dependent, as well as sensitive to 
methodological differences across studies. For Britain, for example, Machin (1995) finds no 
effect of unions on closures in the 1980s, while Bryson (2004a) finds evidence of a positive 
impact during the 1990s. Union recognition is associated with a 5-6 percent higher closure 
probability. In the USA, Freeman and Kleiner (1999) identified a positive association between 
closure and unionisation, but DiNardo and Lee (2004) find no statistically significant relationship 
during the period 1983-99. While the evidence of unions’ impact on closure is mixed, the 
                                                 
3 This benefited employers, of course, and may have reduced their scepticism toward unions in general (Bowman, 
2002). 
4 Running simple OLS-regressions of log wages on seniority, age, years of education and a union dummy on 10 
percent random samples from our data of fulltime workers for 1995 and 2003 (see section 3 on details on data) , 
shows that the private sector union premium increases from 2.2 percent to 3.0 percent.    
5 This does not imply a reduction of centralised wage determination, but that local bargaining supplements the 
centrally determined wage.  
empirical literature on growth is fairly unambiguous: unionisation decreases annual employment 
growth. In Australia, Wooden and Hawke (2000) found a negative union effect of 2.5 percent. In 
Britain, Bryson (2004b) estimates a negative union effect of 3-4 percent during the 1990s, which 
is similar to the effect estimated by Blanchflower et al. (1991) for the early 1980s. In Canada, 
Long (1993) identifies 3.7 percent lower growth in unionised companies, while in the 
neighbouring USA, union plants were associated with 4 percent lower growth than non-union 
plants in the period 1974-1980 (Leonard, 1992).6 Thus the effect is surprisingly similar across 
Anglo-American countries and over time, i.e., it ranges between -2.5 and -4 percent. This has led 
some analysts to refer to the employment effect of unions as the ‘one constant’ in studies of 
unions’ economic effects (Addison and Belfield, 2004).7 Although others would argue that this 
employment effect just follows from the diminishing role of unionised industries in the Anglo-
American economies, a brief look at Figure 1, which depicts the relationship in Norway between 
5-digit SIC industry employment growth from 1997 to 2003 and 5-digit industry union density in 
1997, reveals no such obvious pattern. Thus at least for Norway this explanation is too simple. 
Even for Britain this explanation is probably simplistic, since Bryson (2004) shows that the union 
effect during the period 1990-1998 occurs within 2-digit SIC industries.  
This is the first study of how unionisation affects closures and workplace employment 
growth in Norway. The paper seeks to contribute to the literature in four other ways.  First, we 
estimate union closure and growth effects in different parts of the workplace wage distribution.  
Second, using generalised order probits (Williams, 2006) we consider whether union effects differ 
across different magnitudes of employment growth (shrinkage).  Third, in the case of Norway, we 
are able to account for the potential endogeneity of union density by instrumenting using union 
membership fees. Fourth, using the yearly panel data for Norway, we are able to estimate System-
GMM models (Roodman, 2005) to identify the causal impact of unionisation on short-run and 
long-run employment growth. 
 The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses why unions 
affect closure and growth theoretically. Our data are described in Section 3. Section 4 describes 
the basic econometric models. Section 5 describes unionisation in Britain and Norway, 
differences in trends and economic roles. In Section 6 we analyse the impact of unionisation on 
workplaces’ closure probability, while Section 7 is devoted to analyses of the impact of 
                                                 
6 In a recent study of State recoveries Krol and Svorny (2007) link slower job growth to union influence.  
7 However, some studies find quite different results.  DiNardo and Lee (2004), find no statistically significant union 
effect on employment in the US and Machin and Wadhwani (1991) find the union negative effect in the early 1980s 
is confined to workplaces undergoing substantial organisational change.  Furthermore, they find that unionised firms 
grew more quickly than non-unionised firms in the late 1970s. 
 
unionisation on growth. Section 8 presents an analysis of the dynamics of labour demand and the 
relationship to unionisation. We end our paper with a brief conclusion and a discussion of the 
implications in Section 9.   
 
 
2. Unions, Closures and Growth in the Theoretical Literature 
 
Unions perform a number of functions that affect workplaces either directly or indirectly.  In this 
section we will discuss four of these. The first three are directly related to unions’ function at the 
workplace (Bryson, 2004a). First, unions provide workers with a collective voice (Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984). Second, they conduct bargaining. Third, they act as employers’ agents in 
mediating employer strategies (Vroman, 1990). Fourth, and of particular relevance to Norway, is 
unions’ effect on aggregate performance through bargaining at different levels in the economy 
(workplace, organisation, sector, nationally). The level at which unions bargain is partly a function 
of what workers seek at workplace level but it also reflects the interests of both unions and 
employers.  These four elements may affect closures (and growth) in different ways.  
 If unions bargain over wages successfully, they are able to raise wages for their members 
above market wages. These rent seeking activities raise costs and lower profitability. By pushing 
wages above the value of marginal labour productivity unions may increase closure hazards. 
However, if firms successfully organise workplaces with excess profit, bargaining may only 
increase the surplus share going to union workers at the expense of the employers. In this case it 
is not clear that the closure hazard will be affected.  
Union bargaining affects not only wages, but also investments. If wages increase, then 
employers substitute capital for labour, thus increasing investments. This may improve 
productivity and reduce employment growth if wages and agreements are not renegotiated 
(Grout, 1984). If renegotiation occurs, then the level of investments will generally be suboptimal 
(Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004:411), which again may push workplaces towards closure. Hirsch 
(1992) argues that lower R&D expenditures in unionised workplaces make these workplaces less 
adaptable to a changing economic environment. But investors may also be deterred from 
investing due to unions’ extraction of rents, and such underinvestment may heighten the risk of 
closure. A further issue is the utility that unions are seeking to maximise. If unions care about the 
jobs of their members they will seek to bargain over employment as well as wages. Just bargaining 
over wages and employment, however, is not enough to ensure productive efficiency. Where 
workers are risk averse, it is necessary for unions and employers to bargain over unemployment 
benefits, wages and labour (known as strongly efficient bargaining) to ensure productive 
efficiency (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004).8  
 While the above considerations have dominated the recent literature, Freeman and 
Medoff (1984) stressed the role unions perform as mediators of workers’ concerns and 
grievances, and their potential to act as agents of the firm. The idea is that not only are unions 
more effective in conveying information to employers, thus ensuring efficiency gains by 
improving motivation and providing stricter controls, they make employers better informed 
decision-takers. All these aspects tend to make unions improve efficiency and thus reduce closure 
hazards. However, it is not clear whether the union voice mechanism actually improves employer 
profitability since engagement with union voice brings costs as well.     
Unions and employers may bargain over wages at different levels - either locally at plant-
level or firm level, or else at a more centralised level where the agreement covers whole sectors. 
The level of an agreement can affect both labour costs and productivity.  For example, in an 
industry where the majority of workers are unionised, employers may be less concerned about the 
additional costs of wage hikes since others in the industry may be expected to shoulder the same 
union wage costs.  This is less likely to be the case where union bargaining is fragmented, or 
where only a minority of firms in an industry are unionised.  Thus, the question of how 
unionisation affects closures and growth is intrinsically linked to how different bargaining 
regimes affect closures and growth. Ultimately, a workplace closes when its financial performance 
no longer satisfies the current owners because the expected value of their outside options (for 
example, new investments or plants) is greater than the expected net income stream from the 
current workplace. Consequently, closure is irrevocably linked to financial performance. Recent 
empirical research supports Freeman and Medoff’s conjecture that union effects on productivity 
depend critically on how positively the employer engages with the union (Bryson et al., 2006). 
There is at least one framework that links wage structure and bargaining regimes to 
growth and productivity in an economy on a steady state growth path.  Rehn and Meidner (Rehn, 
1952) argued that low pay inequality acted as a tax on low productivity firms and a subsidy on 
high productivity firms, encouraging a shift towards higher average productivity and higher 
aggregate output. Agell and Lommerud (1993) and Moene and Wallerstein (1997) formalise this 
notion, and the latter embed it together with a mechanism of vintage technology (Johansen, 
                                                 
8 This becomes even more complicated where workers are heterogeneous and may be represented by several unions. 
One usually assumes that coordinated bargaining results in wage compression. If the right-to-manage model prevails, 
i.e., employers determine employment after wages are set, even coordinated bargaining may not result in wage 
compression, and may instead produce wages reflecting the labour demand elasticity of the different worker groups 
(Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004:403). 
 
1959) into a steady state growth model. Assuming that workplaces in decentralised and 
centralised bargaining regimes are equally productive at entry, their productivity follows the same 
productivity path until closure, and unions are equally strong, the model of Moene and 
Wallerstein (1997) implies that centralised bargaining is associated with higher exit and entry rates 
than decentralised bargaining. Thus for our purpose, we should observe higher rates of closures 
associated with unions and centralised bargaining.     
 The mechanisms linking unions to employment growth can partly be understood by the 
same set of theories that explain unions’ impact on closure. A priori, effects are ambiguous and 
may differ in the long-run compared to the short-term.  A union wage premium encourages 
employers to substitute capital for labour, and increase capital investments, thus reducing 
employment growth directly. On the other hand, if unions discourage capital investment through 
rent-extraction, this may lower investments (Hirsch, 1992), potentially avoiding capital 
substitution in the short-term at least. Long-run improvements in productivity, even if achieved 
through short-term job loss, will improve the competitive position of the firm and thus 
potentially raise employment.  
Machin and Wadwhani (1991) note that if union suppliers are regarded as unreliable 
suppliers, such branding may hurt sales growth and thus lower employment growth. This ‘bad 
reputation’ effect may be more relevant for Britain than for Norway, but even in the latter case, 
we cannot rule out employer scepticism about the role of unions in certain industries.9  
With decreasing return to scale production technology, heterogeneous labour and 
different bargaining power for different worker groups, the search model of Cahuc et al. (2007) 
implies that due to firms’ strategic manipulation of wages through employment and capital 
decisions, increased bargaining power for some groups may lead to over-employment relative to 
other groups and actually in some cases increase overall employment.  
Finally, if union bargaining increases wages and fringe benefits it can reduce worker 
turnover and quits (e.g., Elias, 2004) thus increasing the labour supply facing a workplace. In 
itself this does not have any implication for growth. However, if a shock occurs causing a labour 
demand hike, for example if sales growth makes it desirable to grow, being attractive to workers 
will make it more likely that the supply of labour will rise and satisfy the increased demand.  
Taken together, these theoretical observations suggest counter-veiling union influences on 
                                                 
9 Typically this will be within the construction sector and restaurants and bars. Note also that the Norwegian 
bargaining system is such that every second year there are main negotiations, while in the intervening years only 
minor wage adjustments are open for negotiations. By agreement, strikes are ruled out between the main 
negotiations, and while strikes may of course occur in conflict with the agreement, striking workers will have a high 
probability of loosing in court. This ‘peace-agreement’ makes Machin and Wadwhani’s (1991) point less relevant for 
Norway.   
 
employment growth and suggest some differences in effects across Britain and Norway.  There is 
therefore value in exploring these relationships empirically. 
 
 
3. Data 
 
3.1. Data sets 
 
We utilise questionnaire survey data from Britain and Norway plus additional register data 
information which is only available for Norway. First, we exploit the British Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (WERS) Panel 1998-2004 which provides large-scale, statistically 
reliable evidence about a broad range of industrial relations and employment practices across 
most sectors of the British economy. WERS is collected to map employment relations practices 
in workplaces across Britain and to monitor changes in those practices over time. The level of 
observation is the workplace, namely a place of employment at a single address or site. The 1998 
data are a stratified random sample of workplaces in Britain with at least 10 employees.  
Information on these workplaces was collected through a face-to-face interview with the senior 
manager responsible for employment relations on a day-to-day basis.10  In addition, we utilise 
linked data from employees to identify workplaces’ rank in the wage distribution. The Panel 
follows up on a random sub-sample of the workplaces that participated in the 1998 survey, had 
continued to be in operation throughout the intervening six-year period, and employed at least 10 
employees at the time of the 2004 interview.  In total 938 interviews were conducted, a response 
rate of 75 percent.  In addition, the remaining establishments from the 1998 survey that were not 
selected for a Panel interview were screened by telephone to establish whether they were still in 
existence and to establish the current level of employment at their workplace.  Of the 1,506 
private sector workplaces in the 1998 survey, 1,262 were still in existence in 2004, 240 had closed 
down and 4 were unaccounted for.11   
 Second, we exploit the Norwegian Workplace Employment Relations Survey 1997 and 
2003 (NWERS). These surveys comprise a questionnaire, answered in the early winter of 1997 and 
2003 by the daily manager or personnel manager of roughly 2300 Norwegian establishments from 
both public and private sectors. These establishments are sampled from establishments with more 
than 10 employees. The sample is constructed so that large establishments are over-sampled (for 
                                                 
10 Fieldwork began in 1997 but the bulk of the interviews occurred in 1998. 
11 Eight cases identified as private sector workplaces in WERS98 were dropped from the analyses because 
subsequent checks revealed that they were not workplaces. 
example, all establishments with more than 300 employees are included in the sample). 
Furthermore, these surveys are constructed so that a significant proportion of the establishments in 
the later surveys participated in the previous one thus providing invaluable information on 
workplaces across time. Each workplace in the NWERS-surveys (1997, 2003) is identified by a 
unique identifying number making it possible to link the surveys to administrative register data and 
other surveys as well. The NWERS2003-establishments employ over 350 000 workers, i.e., nearly a 
fifth of the Norwegian workforce.12 The questionnaire covers topics such as structure of 
representation at the workplace, means of communication with employees, incidence of 
negotiation over compensation, work practices and organisation issues. As such, it is quite similar 
to WERS.           
 The third data source is the public administrative register data. It comprises all employers 
and their employees in Norway 1995–2004 (roughly 150000 employers and 1800000 employees 
each year) employed on May 15th each year. Each worker, each establishment (workplace) and 
each firm are identified by unique identifying numbers, making it possible to track workers as 
well as firms and establishments through time. This data set is similar to the integrated register 
based data system, Current System for Social Data (CSSD), linked by Statistics Norway, 
comprising information from public administrative registers (except CSSD is not restricted to 
employment spells active on May 15th). This linked employer-employee data set provides 
information on workers (gender, educational qualifications), jobs - for example earnings, daily 
wage, hourly wage (only 2002-2004), the value of fringe benefits as they are reported to the tax 
authorities, union membership, weekly working hours (intervals, exact hours 2002-2004), 
seniority - firm and establishment identifying numbers and on establishment characteristics such 
as industry (5-digit SIC), sector and municipality. It is possible to link information from this data 
system to the NWERS-establishments, thus providing information on workers, workplaces, firm 
and local labour market (municipality) conditions and information on detailed industry code (3-
digit SIC) conditions.  
 In sum, the WERS and NWERS-surveys are similarly sampled, and the questionnaires 
comprise quite similar questions to managers. Where the surveys differ are on information from 
trade union representatives and on workers. No information from trade union representatives 
exists in the Norwegian data. Worker information in NWERS is linked from public 
administrative register data, WERS is based on questionnaire information. NWERS may thus 
comprise more reliable information, while WERS contains richer and more precise subjective 
information. 
                                                 
12 The sampling procedure and the questionnaire are described in Holth (2003) and Torp (2005). 
 3.2. Important measures 
 
WERS information on workplace outcomes in 2004 comes from survey interviewers’ contacts 
with workplaces as part of the second wave of the panel.  The outcome codes provide the 
information to identify workplace closure (Chaplin et al, 2005). Workplace closure is defined as 
the complete cessation of the activities of a workplace with the termination of all contracts of 
employment. The transfer of employment to a new site or to another workplace in the same 
organization is not included in this definition, nor is a simple change of ownership such as a take-
over. In Norway a closure is defined from the administrative register (where the workplace’s 
number quite simply disappears).13 In some cases this reflects the creation of a new unit. The 
rules for changing a workplace’s identifying number are as follows: If all employees are identical, 
the workplace has to change a) owners, b) address (change of municipality) and c) main product 
(new major industry code) to get a new number. If all employees are not identical, the workplace 
has to change two of the following three criteria: a) owners, b) address (change of municipality) 
and c) main product (new major industry code) to get a new number. Thus one is fairly restrictive 
when providing a new identifying number to an old workplace.  
 For workplaces found operating, employment in WERS is recorded in the follow-up 
interview in 2004. Where workplaces were not interviewed in 2004, either because they were not 
in the random sub-sample followed up, or because their employment size had fallen below the 10 
employee threshold for an interview, their employment data were obtained from a telephone 
screening interview. Employment and employment growth in NWERS are taken directly from 
the administrative registers, measuring workers having an active (on-going) work spell on May 
15th in the relevant year (i.e., 1997 and 2003). Note that the minimum criteria for such jobs are 
that they last at least a fortnight; imply expected weekly working hours of at least four hours, and 
that wages are reported to the tax authorities and are linkable to the job files. 
 Information on unionisation is one of the areas where WERS and NWERS differ. WERS 
rests solely on precise questionnaire information, while NWERS mixes questionnaire and register 
information. We focus on three measures of unionisation: a dummy for union recognition at the 
workplace, dummies for the number of union agreements at the workplace, and workplace union 
density. Unions are recognised if agreements exist between the employer and at least one union.14  
                                                 
13 Note that there exists a separate number series for firms (owners).  
14 Due to the design of the Norwegian NWERS one may observe missing information on the question of how many 
agreement(s) with union(s) do you have?  However, one can observe whether the employer determines wages by 
participating in collective bargaining. For these few cases we have re-coded the number of agreements as three 
implying that unions are recognised for bargaining, and added a dummy for missing union information.      
In the Norwegian data union density is calculated using information on individual union 
membership reported to the tax authorities for tax exemption purposes (whereas in WERS these 
data are collected in an interview with the employer). 
 When we estimate log growth equations we are only able to utilise information from 
surviving workplaces, i.e., a selected sample. We seek to account for potential bias arising from 
the link between unionization and survival probabilities using a Heckman selection model.  We 
argue that variables expressing entry barriers are appropriate instruments. Such variables affect 
the owners’ outside options, and they do not affect the growth of surviving workplaces. We 
believe that information on capital utilisation at 2-digit industry (SIC) offers the potential for 
identification.15 Our idea is to identify a variable that measures minimum entry costs for new 
workplaces. Such a variable can be interpreted as capturing entry barriers. However, we are only 
able to identify such a variable for Norway. In the Norwegian data we can measure the minimum 
level of capital related to buildings and plants of entry workplaces, and to harmonise this across 
different workforce entry sizes, we measure this minimum start-up capital level per employee. 
Our final variable captures the relative growth in the industry minimum start-up capital level per 
employee from 1994-95 to 1996-97. 
 In the Norwegian case, using register data only, we can follow each workplace each year 
until 2004 or until closure. Thus we are able to construct a panel of workplaces covering the 
period 1997 to 2003.  
 
 
4. Econometric Models – Empirical Strategy for Studying Long-Term 
Survival and Growth 
 
The probability of workplace closure can be written as: 
 
1) Pr (Ift – Cft  ≥ Aft ) ↔ Pr ( Ift – Cft  – Aft ≥ 0), 
 
where Ift, Cft, and Aft denote workplace f’s expected discounted operating income from 
production, expected discounted costs and alternative value/outside options for the owner of 
workplace f, respectively, evaluated at period t. The owners of workplace f close the workplace 
when expected net surplus from production provides less net value than the owners’ alternative 
                                                 
15 Note that the average capital level as such is endogenous, even at entry and even if considered sunk, since as 
pointed out by Cabral (1995) this conveys information on expected future performance. 
return to their investments. We model this relationship by assuming that Yft =Ift – Cft  – Aft, 
which expresses overall expected discounted net value from further production, is a latent 
variable. Then we assume that: 
 
2) Yft =xf’b+εft,  
 
where εf ~ N(0,1), and the x’s denote exogenous covariates affecting the expected discounted net 
value. Note the x-vector mixes covariates from different time periods as well as time-invariant 
covariates, thus subscript t is dropped. 
 We first observe our sample of active workplaces 1997 (Norway)/1998 (UK), and then 
observe the surviving workplaces 2003 (Norway)/2004 (UK). Thus we assume that yf is an 
indicator variable taking the value 1 if Yft is negative during our period of observation (1997-2003 
(Norway), 1998-2004 (UK)), zero otherwise. Since a negative Yft implies closure, we can express 
the probability of closure during our period of observation as:  
 
3) Pr(yf =1)=Φ(xf’b),  
 
where Φ expresses the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  
Our vector of exogenous covariates is decomposed as follows: 
 
4) xf’b=b1’Union+b2’Basic_controls+b3’Extended_controls+b4’entry_barrier(cost), 
 
where basic controls are size, age, industry and regional dummies, extended controls are dummies 
for main occupation and male-dominated workforce, lagged log relative growth, dummies for 
performance, and variables expressing market competition.  
Next we follow the previous literature and study the relationship between unionisation in 
the base year and growth over a period of six years. These regressions establish how employment 
growth is independently related to a number of workplace characteristics at the beginning of the 
period including unionisation. Between our base year and end year background variables may 
have changed, thus affecting workplaces’ employment trajectory but we take no account of this 
until we model year-on-year employment change. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
When we model employment growth for surviving workplaces with OLS we are ignoring 
the possibility that growth is related to survival. Running OLS-regressions on the surviving 
workplaces will therefore yield biased estimates due to selection. Our main equation is: 
 
5) ∆lnLft =zf’a+ηft,  
 
where ηft ~ N(0,σ), ∆lnLft expresses log employment growth for workplace f from period t-6 to 
period t, and that the z’s denote exogenous covariates from period t-6 or earlier thought to 
affecting employment growth.16 In the UK data t-1 and t is 1998 and 2004, respectively, while for 
Norway t-1 and t are 1997 and 2003, respectively. However, to acknowledge the potential 
selection problem we also conduct regressions assuming cov(ηft,εft)≠0, and estimate 3)17 and 5) 
jointly by maximum likelihood (STATA’s Heckman-procedure). Note that we assume that the z’a 
can be expressed: 
 
6) zf’a=a1Union+a2Basic_controls+a3Extended_controls, 
 
i.e., we achieve identification in the growth equation since variables expressing entry barriers will 
make owners more reluctant to close, but should not affect the growth of incumbents. We argue 
that variables expressing entry barriers also measure variation in owners’ outside options. At the 
same time, the owners’ outside options, conditioned on survival, should not affect the growth of 
surviving workplaces.18 We are, however, only able to follow this approach in the Norwegian 
case. For the UK analysis identification rests on functional form only. 
 These growth regressions raise a final important issue that should be addressed: the 
growth equation does not take into account that unions may have differential impact on different 
levels of growth. For instance, it may be that unions influence small changes, but are powerless to 
affect major employment changes. Thus we estimate a generalized ordered Probit (a partial 
proportional odds model, see Williams (2006)) using Richard William’s GOLOGIT2-procedure 
for STATA. We assume the following growth categories:   
k=1 if ∆lnLft <-0.25, 
   k=2 if -0.25<=∆lnLft <0, 
   k=3 if 0<=∆lnLft <0.25, 
                                                 
16 The z-vector includes controls for workforce size in period t-6 in the form of size dummies. Using log workforce 
as a control, another formulation of our model would be lnLt=alnLt-6+b’xt-6+ηft . 
17 We then model the probability of survival, i.e., 1-Pr(y=1). 
18 A related argument is found in Luttmer (2007), where barriers to entry and fixed costs affect growth and the size 
distribution in the economy, but then only through the entry firm population and not the incumbent firms. 
   k=4 if 0.25<=∆lnLft . 
Then assuming the normal distribution as in 5) we have: 
 
7)   Pr (k=1)=Ф(-0.25-z’c1), 
   Pr (k=2)=Ф(-z’c2)- Ф(-0.25-z’c1), 
   Pr (k=3)=Ф(0.25-z’c3)- Ф(-z’c2), 
   Pr (k=4)=1-Ф(0.25-z’c4). 
 
The z’c-vector can be expressed: zf’c=cuUnion+ cxBasic_controls. When we estimate this model 
using the GOLOGIT2-procedure, our point of departure is the assumption of an equal c-vector 
across the k’s. If this is rejected, the model is estimated allowing an unequal c-vector across the 
categories of growth.   
  
 
5. Changes in Union Participation and Bargaining, 1997-2004 
 
In this section we briefly describe the development in unionisation in Norway and Britain during 
our period of 1997/1998 to 2003/2004. Table 1 presents background statistics weighted to be 
nationally representative for the population of workplaces with more than 10 employees. As 
noted in the introduction, the difference between Britain and Norway regarding unions is 
striking. Norway is much more unionised than Britain. The workplace union recognition rate in 
Britain is one third of the rate in Norway 1997/1998, and then fell to one quarter in 2003/2004. 
The percentage of workers employed by union workplaces was half the Norwegian rate in 
1997/1998, and fell further to around two-fifths.   
In Britain one observes a small decline in union density – whether measured in terms of 
mean workplace-level density or aggregate union density among employees - while the percentage 
of union members in Norway is basically unchanged.  However, in both countries one observes a 
small reduction in union recognition.  
Multi-unionism, i.e., agreements with more than one union, is rather rare in Britain: in 
1998 and 2004 around 5 percent of private sector workplaces had multiple unions. This contrasts 
markedly with Norway, where the percentage of multi-union workplaces actually rose from 30 
percent in 1997 to 32 percent in 2003.19 
                                                 
19 The occurrence of multi-unionism does not necessarily imply that the management has to deal with several unions 
separately. In Norway it is common in larger enterprises and corporations to select an enterprise union representative 
who acts as the unions’ representative in negotiations with management on sensitive issues like downsizing and 
Perhaps the most striking difference of all appears to be the dominance of individual 
wage determination in Britain compared with Norway.  In Britain, almost nine-in-ten workers are 
in workplaces where at least some of the workers have their pay set via individual wage 
determination.  This compares with a small and declining percentage of workers in Norway (24 
percent in 1997 and 19 percent in 2004). Conversely, centralised bargaining covers a substantial 
and growing percentage of employees in Norway, while in Britain coverage is small and 
diminishing.  
Finally, Table 1 shows that there are only small differences between the UK and Norway 
with respect to closure rates and growth during this period. While closure rates are slightly higher 
in the UK than in Norway (18.7 vs. 17.4) – contrary to our conjecture based on Moene and 
Wallerstein (1997) -  log growth is slightly less negative (-0.2 vs. -1.2). 
 
 
6. The Impact of Unionisation on Workplace Closure 
 
In Britain there is a big union-non-union differential in closure rates with unionised workplaces 
having an 8 percentage point higher probability of closure relative to their non-union counter-
parts (25 percent and 17 percent respectively). However, there are also very large differences 
within the unionised sector, closure rates being by far the lowest in workplaces with 3 or more 
unions.  Of course, there are few such workplaces in the private sector in Britain and they tend to 
be larger workplaces, so we can not discount the possibility that this closure differential within 
the union sector is partly a function of workplace size. In Norway closure rates are a little higher 
in the non-union than the union sector (19.6 percent versus 16.0 percent) but they are highest of 
all in workplaces with three or more union agreements (21.2 percent).  
The descriptive information above does not take into account workplace characteristics 
such as size, industry variation, differences in market structure and differences in previous 
workplace performance. Thus in Table 2 we turn to Probit regressions of the probability of 
closures. Table 2 shows the estimated marginal effects from Probit models, while Table A1 
presents the full regression results. The key variable of interest is the (0,1) union recognition 
dummy variable. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
closure of plants within the enterprise.  In a study of the 10 major enterprises in Norway  9 had selected such a union 
representative (Utgaard, 2004), and the only one not having established such an arrangement, Scandinavian Airline 
System (SAS), has in recent years experienced recurrent strikes and hold-ups.  Similarly, in the UK employers may 
negotiate with multiple unions jointly in what is termed ‘single-table bargaining’ (Bryson and Wilkinson, 2002). 
Columns 1 to 3 present models for Britain, while the models for Norway are presented in 
columns 4 to 7.  In Model 1 (4) we control for size, age, a dummy for belonging to a single-plant 
firm, and dummies for industry (1-digit SIC) and region. In Model 2 (5) we add controls for main 
occupation, a dummy for being male-dominated, lagged employment growth over the previous 
year, workplace financial performance, and market and competition variables. Finally in Model 3 
(7) we replace single-digit SIC industry dummies with two-digit ones.  
 Union recognition is not statistically significantly associated with workplace closure in 
Britain or Norway.  The point estimate is positive for Britain, whereas it is negative for Norway.  
 Table 2 also reveals other quite interesting facts related to workplace closure. Recent job 
cuts and recruitment problems are associated with higher closure probabilities in both Britain and 
Norway. Since these variables capture previous bad performance this finding is not surprising. 
Similarly, when we observe that lagged employment growth in Norway is associated with reduced 
closure rates this is as expected.  The positive association between lagged employment growth 
and closure in Britain could be interpreted as an indication of inefficiencies arising from (too) 
rapid growth. While the competition variables do not seem to be of importance in Britain, for 
workplaces in the open Norwegian economy having one’s main market abroad is associated with 
higher rates of closures though, perhaps surprisingly, this is contingent on competition not being 
strong.  
Finally, one should note the impact from our relative capital growth measure on closure. 
In Sub-Sections 3.2 and 3.3 we argue that this captures the impact of entry barriers on closure, 
and thus are expected to affect closure negatively. Model 6 of Table 2 shows this to be true in 
Norway.20    
 In Table 3 we repeat the analyses of Table 2 using alternative measures of workplace 
unionisation. We report only the marginal effects associated with the union variables.  In the case 
of Norway neither the number of union agreements nor union density at the workplace affect 
closure probabilities.  However, the analysis for Britain reveals the same puzzling finding that we 
observed in the descriptive statistics of Table 2: when at least 3 unions are recognised, the closure 
hazard drops significantly. Compared to the reference case, no unions, recognising at least 3 
unions implies a lowering of the closure hazard by 10-13 percent.  This effect is robust to the 
inclusion of controls such as workplace size.  It is nevertheless worth bearing in mind that these 
workplaces only make up 2 percent of the weighted private sector sample in Britain. 
 Until now we have ignored the effect that unions have in raising wages.  In both countries 
there is a positive union wage premium.  This may be to the detriment of workplaces.  Yet wages 
also reflect workplace productivity and union workplaces may become high wage/high 
productivity workplace in order to accommodate unionisation.  High wages in union workplaces 
may reflect high productivity and/or high union bargaining power.  Low wages in unionised 
workplaces may reflect low bargaining power and/or low productivity.  Either way, above market 
wages may induce closure in the long-run. If the impact of unionisation on closure depends on 
the workplace’s position in the wage distribution then these impacts may cancel each other out 
on average. Arguably Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) voice theory is more relevant at the bottom 
of the wage distribution than at the top, while a high average workplace wage may reflect high 
productivity but also high union bargaining power. Thus we conduct similar probit regressions as 
those reported in table 2 and 3, but add wages and unionXwages cross-terms. For the UK these 
regressions are limited to wage dummies due to the way wages are reported.21 For this reason, we 
also loose some observations for the UK regressions. Table 4 presents the estimated marginal 
effects of union and wages on the closure probability based on our regressions. 
 In the UK low wage non-union workplaces experience higher probability of closure than 
other workplaces. Thus unions prolong life for low-wage workplaces in the UK. This is 
consistent with a union voice effect dominating any union bargaining effect. In Norway high 
wage workplaces experience lower closure hazards than others, but not if the workplace is 
unionised. If the high wage workplace is unionised, then it experiences higher closure rates than 
others (significant with a p-value of 0.052).   
 For Norway we have also conducted the regressions adding union density, log average 
workplace wages and cross-terms. All marginal effects are significant at a 5 percent level. This 
confirms our findings above. If one calculates the marginal effect at the 10th percentile, median 
and the 90th percentile of the wage distribution, one finds no significant impact at the 10th and the 
median, but a strong significant and positive impact of union density at the 90th percentile.22 
Increasing union density by 10 percent increases the closure hazard by 1.3 percent.  Thus, 
although on average unions appear to have no effect on closure, when one conditions on wages, 
                                                                                                                                                        
20 A likelihood-ratio test rejects the assumption of excluding the variable from the model, i.e., our capital measure 
contributes significantly to the model’s explanatory power.   
21 For the UK we match in workplace-level wages from banded wage data reported by employees. 
22 The results of Table 4’s 1) and 2) are not directly comparable, since the dummies in 1) measure the impact relative 
to mid-wage non-unionised workplaces, while 2) measures a continuous relationship, but they reveal the same 
tendencies. For example, both models show that high wage unionised workplace close quicker, and that unionisation 
prolongs the life of low-wage workplaces. In case 2) you can calculate the marginal effect by assuming for example 
50 percent unionisation and high wages of 7 (average workplace log wage=7). Thus increasing the union density by 1 
percentage point from 50 percent increases the closure hazard by 0.01*[-1.123*0.5+0.216*7]=0.0095. For very low 
wage highly unionised workplaces (e.g., wage=4 and union density=0.99) the marginal impact of increasing the union 
density from 99 percent to 100 percent is 0.01*[-1.123*0.99+0.216*4]=-0.0025. 
  
we find a reduced probability of closure in low wage union workplaces in the UK and Norway, 
but in Norway we also find a higher probability of closure in high wage union workplaces.   
 
 
7. The Impact of Unionisation on Workplace Growth 
 
Annual growth rates were close to zero in Britain and differed little by union status. In Norway, 
growth per annum was around -1 percent per annum for the whole private sector, but there was 
negative growth among union workplaces (-1.7 percent per annum) and positive growth among 
non-union workplaces (0.7 percent per annum). To establish whether these associations are 
independent of other factors associated with employment growth we estimated the same models 
as in Section 4. Note, however, as pointed out in Section 4 that the regressions in this section do 
not attempt to identify the causal impact of unions on employment. Rather, in accordance with 
the previous literature, we map descriptively how employment growth is related to a number of 
workplace characteristics including unionisation.  
Table 5 shows how growth is related to union recognition, number of union agreements 
and union density. We only present the estimated parameters associated with the union variables 
(but Table A2 presents the full results related to the analysis of union recognition). Models 1, 2, 4 
and 5 are estimated using OLS, Model 3, Model 6 and Model 7 are estimated jointly with a 
survival selection equation using maximum likelihood.  
 The table reveals that union recognition is not independently associated with employment 
growth in British workplaces between 1998 and 2004. This is so whether or not we account for 
the possible selection bias arising through workplace survival. Furthermore, the selection 
equation given this set of covariates is independent of the growth equation.  
The story for Norway is completely different. During the period 1997 to 2003 Norway 
behaves more like what previous studies have found for the Anglo-American countries. 
Employment growth is 3 to 5 percent lower in workplaces where unions are recognised in 1997 
compared to those that do not recognise unions. We also identify a strong negative selection 
effect, i.e., conditional on past performance, we observe that there is something unobserved 
about surviving workplaces that is negatively correlated with their growth (Model 6). This is 
consistent with a regression-towards-the-mean interpretation.    
 It also appears that Norway and Britain are quite different regarding how growth is 
affected by our controls. In Norway younger workplaces and smaller workplaces have stronger 
growth than older and larger workplaces, while in Britain we do not observe any relationship 
between size, age and lagged growth. 
 Table 5 also presents results regarding the other union variables, namely union density 
and the number of recognised unions. In Britain workplaces with at least three recognised unions 
in 1998 have a 4.3 percent lower growth rate than non-union workplaces (Model 2). However the 
effect is statistically non-significant once conditioned on 2-digit SIC’s and once one adjusts for 
sample selection arising from survival. In Norway, on the other hand, unions are associated with 
a 4-5 percent lower growth rate than non-union workplaces even when one takes account of 
sample selection. The exception is workplaces with at least 3 recognised unions, which have the 
same growth as non-union workplaces.  
 These analyses leave three questions unanswered. The first question is whether or not 
these union effects are related to workplace wages in a similar way that we found that the union 
effects on closures were for Norway. The second question is whether our surprising findings are 
due to a differential impact of unions on different levels of growth? It may be that unions seem 
to have no impact on growth in the UK due to offsetting union impacts on job cuts and 
expansion. Similarly, when we observe 3-4 percent lower growth associated with unions in 
Norway, is this primarily driven by unions affecting employers’ job cuts or their potential for 
employment growth? The third question, which will be addressed in Section 8, is whether or not 
the observed relation between unions and growth in Norway corresponds to a causal impact of 
unions on employment growth?  
 To answer the first question, we have estimated the growth equations adding wages and 
unionXwages cross-terms.23 For the UK these analyses did not bring any new insight. For 
Norway, we do observe a significant negative cross-effect, while wages and unions affect growth 
positively. Thus we observe that high wage workplaces grow more than low wage workplaces, 
but the presence of unions severely dampens growth at these high wage workplaces. At the 
bottom of the wage distribution, however, the negative impact of unions on growth disappears.  
 To answer the second question we have estimated several Generalised Ordered Probit 
regressions on the UK and Norwegian data, where we group growth into a variable taking four 
values. Table 6 presents the marginal effect on the probability of being in the four growth 
categories.  We measure union influence by the number of agreements. We show the results 
related to this union variable, because this is where we observe some union impact in the 
Norwegian data. 
                                                 
23 These are available from the authors on request. 
 For the UK nothing much happens. It appears that whatever unions do in Britain, they 
do not affect closures and growth. For Norway, once again we find strong union effects. The 
table shows that unions with one exception increase the probability of both major and minor 
layoffs and job cuts compared to non-agreement workplaces, while they reduce the probability of 
large job hikes. The exception is when only one agreement exists, where the probability of minor 
layoffs and job cuts are reduced compared to non-agreement workplaces. Unions do not affect 
the probability of small workforce increases. 
 
 
8. The Dynamics of the Labour Demand and Union Membership 
 
Our empirical investigations into closure and growth issues in sections 6 and 7 were motivated 
partly by the previous literature and partly by the fact that for both countries we have survey data 
for two points in time with 6 intervening years. The latter fact clearly limits the possibility of 
studying dynamics. Furthermore, one may also be concerned that the union effect we observe is 
not a causal impact of unions on growth. First, if workers anticipate bad times and seek union 
membership as protection this union endogeneity may bias our estimates, potentially turning a 
positive relationship between unions and growth into a negative one (as we observe for Norway). 
Second, the two-period model only addresses the issue of adjustments over 6 years. What’s more, 
we estimate growth using control variables for the base period only.  That is to say, we omit 
variables that may co-vary with employment over time, assuming that the conditioning variables 
in the base period are the only ones that matter.  In fact, if unions affect the long-term level of 
employment as well as short-term adjustments, then the lack of final period explanatory variables 
such as unionization may create an omitted variable bias which also affects our estimates in 
Section 7. This notion is formalised by considering equations 8)-11). Equation 8) describes the 
two-period approach followed by the literature:  
 
8) ∆lnLft =  aLlnLft-x +   auUft-y + axXft-y + εft, 
 
where ∆lnLft expresses log employment growth from the base period x (lnLft - lnLft-x), U 
expresses union density and X other controls. However, since employment very likely depend on 
current period variables, for example as expressed by Equation 9):       
 
9) lnLft = auUft + axXft + ε*ft, 
 this implies that employment growth is affected by growth in the explanatory variables: 
  
10) ∆lnLft =     au∆Uft + ax∆Xft + ε’ft, 
 
where all variables express changes from the base period x.  
 Estimation of 8) by OLS thus ignores the introduction of a lagged endogenous variable, it 
ignores the existence of other endogenous variables and it assumes that cov(Uft, Uft-x)=0 and 
cov(Xft, Xft-x)=0. This can hardly be an ideal solution, since each of these traits implies biased 
OLS estimates.     
Therefore, in this section we address these two issues. Firstly, we use our survey data for 
UK and Norway to conduct growth regressions using control variables for the base period and 
the final period.  
Secondly, we use the Norwegian linked employer-employee panel data to study the 
dynamics of labour demand and union density in more detail, and thus correct for other possible 
weaknesses of Section 7. For such an analysis to make sense, we need to provide more structure 
on our model of labour demand.    
 We start by assuming that there exists an equilibrium relationship between labour 
demand, union density and wages:   
 
11) lnL*ft =βuUft + βwlnWft  + βx‘Xft  + αf +νft,  
 
where ηft ~ N(0,σ), αf expresses a fixed workplace effect, lnL*ft expresses unobserved log labour 
demand for workplace f at period t , Uft and lnWft express workplace f’s union density and log 
wage at period t, while the X’s denote other exogenous covariates affecting labour demand. 
Equation 11), through the fixed effect, incorporates the fact that workplaces may permanently 
differ with respect to labour demand. Note that the fixed effect also captures fixed production 
level differences. Thus, conditioned on the level of production and all other things equal, we 
anticipate that higher wages should reduce labour demand (i.e., βw<0). The impact of union 
density is ambiguous, since one could argue that unions are associated with higher adjustment 
costs (if so implying βu<0) but also improved performance and actually more flexibility through 
Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) voice theory (implying βu>0). Our estimate of βu will thus be 
interpreted as a net impact on equilibrium long-term labour demand.  
 As pointed out above, we (as researchers) do not observe lnL*ft, and neither are the 
workplaces ensured that they at any point of time are able to achieve this desired labour demand. 
We assume that the observed employment change from one period to the next             
(∆lnLft=lnLft - lnLft-1) is partly determined by changes in desired labour demand (∆lnL*ft =lnL*ft - 
lnL*ft-1), partly by the discrepancy between realised and desired labour demand (lnL*ft-1 - lnLft-1) 
and a white noise error term θft. This is expressed in Equation 12):   
 
12) ∆lnLft =γ1∆lnL*ft  + γ2(lnL*ft-1 - lnLft-1) + θft. 
 
Inserting 11) into 12) then yields our econometric specification, Equation 13): 
 
13) ∆lnLft= lnLft - lnLft-1 =γ1βu∆Uft+γ1βw∆lnWft+γ1βx∆Xft+γ2βuUft-1+γ2βwlnWft-1+γ2βxXft-1-γ2lnLft-1        
+αf+γ1νft+(γ2-γ1)νft-1 + θft 
= π1∆Uft+ π2∆lnWft+ π3∆Xft+ π4Uft-1+ π5lnWft-1+ π6Xft-1 +π7lnLft-1 +αf+ε1ft+ ε2ft-1 + θft ,         
 
where the π-s express reduced form parameters and the ε-s error terms. When estimating 13), 
first-differencing will take care of the fixed effect. Since 13) already comprises a growth-term this 
may, unfortunately, cause less robust estimates. But as seen in equations 14)-16), Equation 13) 
can easily be transformed into an equation of levels:   
 
14)   lnLft-lnLft-1=π1(Uft-Uft-1)+π2(lnWft-lnWft-1)+π3(Xft-Xft-1)+π4Uft-1+π5lnWft-1+π6Xft-1+π7lnLft-1 
+αf+ε1ft+ ε2ft-1 + θft,  
15)   lnLft=π1Uft+π2lnWft+π3Xft+(π4-π1)Uft-1+(π5-π2)lnWft-1+(π6-π3)Xft-1+(1+π7)lnLft-1       
+αf+ε1ft+ε2ft-1 +θft, 
16)   lnLft=π1Uft+π2lnWft+π3Xft+π’4Uft-1+π’5lnWft-1+π’6Xft-1+π’7lnLft-1  +αf+ε1ft+ε2ft-1 +θft, 
 
where π’-s now express linear combinations of the original reduced form parameters. 
Estimation of 16) by OLS yields biased estimates due to the moving average composite 
error term. We estimate Equation 16) with System-GMM (see Blundell and Bond (1998) and 
Bond (2002)) using Roodman’s (2005) STATA-procedure for dynamic panel data estimation. The 
procedure is based on first-differencing to take care of the fixed effect, and then uses lagged 
growth-variables as instruments for the levels, while lagged level-variables act as instruments for 
the growth variables. The procedure’s standard treatment and default option for endogenous 
variables yields satisfying tests (see Table 7 for test values). Since our sample of workplaces is 
limited, we present Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005).  
As seen in Equation 17) the estimation of the reduced-form parameters of Equation 16) 
identify the structural parameters of interest:  
 
17) π1 =γ1βu, π2=γ1βw, π3=γ1βx, π’4= π4- π1=γ2βu - π1, π’5= π5- π2= γ2βw,                     
π’6= π6- π3=γ2βx, π’7=1-γ2 
       ↓ 
γ2=1-π’7, βu = -(π’4- π1)/(1- π’7), βw = -(π’5- π2)/(1- π’7), βx = -(π’6- π3)/(1- π’7),        
γ1= - (1- π’7)*π1/ (π’4- π1). 
 
We see that Equation 16) directly identifies γ2. The inverse of γ2, 1/γ2, also provides an estimate 
of how long it takes for a disturbance to the long-term relationship to disappear. We can then 
derive γ1 and the β’s, while the delta-method provides estimates of the structural parameters’ 
standard error.   
Finally, in both the growth regressions and in the System-GMM regression we have 
added the workplace average union membership fee as an ordinary additional IV-instrument, and 
it is the exclusion of this union supply-side variable that allows us to identify our equations. 24 We 
argue that the union membership fee is an appropriate instrument for workplace union density. 
The impact of the average union membership fee on workplace union density is ambiguous, since 
an increased fee in itself should reduce union density, while higher fees could mean that this 
union provides a better service. However, the value of our instrument does not rest on the 
direction of the impact. The important trait is that it does not affect workplace labour demand 
directly.  
We acknowledge that union membership fees as prices are determined in equilibrium by 
aggregate supply and aggregate demand, and this could inviolate the fees as instruments. One 
should, however, note the following. Unions’ membership fees are usually set centrally. This is 
certainly true for the country-wide major unions. Several of these unions are present at most 
workplaces. When determining their membership fees centrally the unions do not take into 
account the economic situation for a specific single firm, and thus the labour demand 
disaggregated at the specific workplace is unaffected. The validity of our instrument is, however, 
                                                 
24 The derivation of this fee is simple. We know for all union workers the union membership fee, and since we know 
workers’ educational qualifications (6-digit) and industry (5-digit SIC), we can calculate from union members’ fee the 
average union membership fee for each combination of 4-digit educational qualificationX3-digit SIC code. Then we 
link this average union membership fee to all workers (non-union and union members), and calculate the workplace 
average union membership fee. 
weakened when fees are set locally or if fees are set as a percentage of earnings (note that even 
then they usually incorporate fixed price elements). This latter case is, however, taken into 
account since, in many specifications, we control for wages. Finally, to add strength to the validity 
of our instrument we also provide tests of the exclusion restrictions. The exclusion of our supply-
side instrument makes us able to identify what we interpret as a labour demand equation. 
Table 7 presents our results on employment growth. The first-difference growth 
regressions of models 1 to 8 provide a background for the dynamic labour demand regression of 
Table 8.25 Models 1 and 2 present the survey annualised growth regressions for UK and Norway, 
respectively, incorporating union density and a dummy for single unit firm as controls, where we 
weight each observation according to the 1997-sampling probability. Albeit not significant (but 
close), the point estimate is clearly positive for Norway. For Britain it is negative, but far from 
significant. Furthermore, running the same regression un-weighted yields a strongly significant 
and positive result for Norway, whereas for Britain we find a positive point estimate with a p-
value of 0.2. This clearly indicates that if a union effect exists, it is stronger among larger 
workplaces than smaller ones.  
Model 3 then repeats the analysis for Norway, but now using the complete panel of 
observations (thus modelling yearly growth). Growth in union density turns strongly significant, 
implying that 10 percentage points growth in union density yields 2 percent higher employment 
growth. Model 4 adds log wages as a control, but this causes only minor changes.  
Model 5 relaxes the assumption that only observations of workplaces that survive until 
2003 are valid, i.e., it incorporates observations of workplaces that died between 1997 and 2003. 
The inclusion of dying workplaces is clearly important, since the union effect turns insignificant, 
with a point estimate of 0.18. This means that the union effect is weaker, possibly even negative 
among the dying workplaces, i.e., implying a negative correlation between union density and size 
for these dying workplaces. This is consistent with our notion that workers seek union 
membership when they anticipate bad times.  
Model 6 then reports the results from the same regression as Model 5, except that we 
now instrument union density using the average union membership fee. As seen by the reported 
test values, our instrument should ideally have performed better statistically, but note that the 
possible bias is towards the OLS-figures of Model 5. The main result is that the positive union 
impact increases 10-fold, and is strongly significant. This figure implies that if union density 
grows by 1 percentage point, then employment increases by 4 percent. 
                                                 
25 The first-difference approach is less sensitive to the exogeneity assumption of controls than the within-
transformation (Cameron and Trivedi (2005:758)). 
Models 7 and 8 repeat the analyses of models 5 and 6, respectively, but drop the 
weighting procedure. The unweighted regressions reveal strongly significant positive union 
impact. One should also note that when union density is instrumented (Model 8), the tests for 
instrument strength and appropriateness improves, and now they are clearly satisfying. This 
implies that our instrument performs less well in small workplaces, but this should come as no 
surprise. Small workplaces will generally be more volatile, and one faces to a larger extent integer 
problems. At the same time, small workplaces may to a greater extent than large workplaces lack 
union recruitment representatives and have more informal labour relations. The union impact, 
however, is basically unchanged compared to the weighted result of Model 6, and thus we can 
infer that when we instrument union density, our results are less sensitive to the weighting 
procedure. 
Let us then address two issues – the sample sensitiveness and the size-union density 
relationship. First, the reader might worry that what we observe in Table 7 is dependent on our 
NWERS-sample of workplaces. Since the Norwegian register data comprise the complete 
population of Norwegian workplaces during 1995 to 2003, to address this issue we picked out all 
workplaces with more than 10 employees in 1997, and then followed them until 2003. Thus the 
data set comprise survivors and dying workplaces. On this data set, we repeated the analysis of 
Table 7’s Model 7 (the estimates are available upon request). This regression was not weighted 
since the data set comprised the complete population. We then identified a strong positive and 
significant union impact of 0.20 (p-value=0.001). This point estimate is remarkably close to the 
result of Model 5 (0.18). The difference is caused by the greater uncertainty due to the sampling 
procedure applied to the data which the analyses of Table 7 are based on. Thus we conclude that 
our results are not confined to the NWERS-sample, but are representative for the Norwegian 
population of workplaces having more than 10 employees (in 1997).   
Second, we should point out that what we show in Table 7 is not the well-known 
observation that union density is higher in larger workplaces than smaller workplace (e.g., 
Schnabel, 2003; Nergaard and Stokke, 2007). The exclusion of the union membership fee (a 
union supply variable) in the final regressions ensures that we estimate a labour demand equation. 
Finally, in Table 8 we turn to the labour demand regressions of Equation 16). These 
regressions incorporate a dummy for single unit workplace and the square root of the 
workplace’s age as additional controls (expressed by the X’s in Equation 16)). Model 1 reports 
the OLS-estimates (which ignores the fixed effect and the moving average error term). Model 2 
reports the results from the within-workplace OLS regression (which takes care of the fixed 
workplace effect, but ignores the bias following a moving average error term), while Model 3 
reports the results when applying the system-GMM regression. In this model the ‘classical’ tests 
(Hansen test and the two Arellano-Bond tests) appear satisfying. We focus on the estimates of 
Model 3, since the estimates of models 1 and 2 are known to be biased.  
The estimated parameters associated with the current period variables can be interpreted 
as the short-term impact. We see that increasing the union density by 1 percentage point appears 
to increase employment by 1.36 percent momentarily. Such a shock dies out, as indicated by the 
inverse of γ2, after roughly ten years. More importantly though, is the long-term impact expressed 
by the structural parameters. We see that 1 percent increases in the equilibrium level of 
employment causes realised employment to grow by 0.35 percent. One percent positive 
discrepancy between the long-term employment level and the realised level causes an 
employment growth of 0.11 percent. The long-term relationship between unions and 
employment is also strong. One percent higher union density implies 3.9 percent higher 
employment.  
 Thus we identify a strong positive causal relationship between union density and 
workplace employment for Norway. Although a social experiment providing exogenous variation 
in union density would be preferable for disentangling and identifying the causal impact of 
unions on employment, we believe that we have achieved the next-best solution.  
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
Using similar data from Norway and Britain covering the period 1997/98 to 2003/4, we have 
studied how unions affect workplace closure and growth. The purpose was to establish whether 
the negative employment growth effects usually estimated for the Anglo-Saxon countries extend 
to Norway, a corporatist country where unions perform a different role to that in liberal regimes, 
a role which is central to Norwegian economic and social policy and one which is deemed useful 
and legitimate by workers and employers alike. If, as some have maintained, the negative effects 
associated with unions found in previous studies from the Anglo-Saxon economies are caused by 
a tradition of conflict, they should be less pronounced in the Norwegian economy.  
In order to compare and contrast our findings with the previous literature most of the 
paper adopts the standard empirical strategy which is based on Probit and OLS regressions 
together with maximum likelihood techniques to account for sample selection arising from 
attrition due to workplace closure. However, we depart from the literature by taking explicit 
account of wages.  We find that unions had no impact, on average, on closures in either country.  
But when we explored union effects according to the workplace’s rank in the wage distribution 
we found that unions prolonged the life of low-wage workplaces in Britain whereas Norwegian 
unions increased (reduced) closure hazards in high (low) waged workplaces.   
Our findings on employment growth run counter to most of the empirical literature.   
Contrary to earlier studies, unions had no effect on workplace growth in Britain, a finding which 
is consistent with muted union effects on wages and a general diminution of union effects on 
workplace outcomes in Britain (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2008). In Norway, union workplaces 
experienced 4 percent per annum lower growth than non-union workplaces. This effect is in line 
with higher estimates from the Anglo-American literature and run counter to our expectation 
that, if anything, one might expect union effects on growth to be lower in Norway, or even 
positive given the role of centralised pay bargaining in setting wages for the majority of both 
unionised and non-unionised workers.  We therefore decided to explore these effects further 
using unique linked employer-employee dynamic panel data for Norway.  These data allow us to 
move beyond the existing literature identifying associations between unionisation and growth by 
identifying the causal impact of union density on employment growth net of wages with a 
technique which explicitly models employers’ underlying labour demand.  The technique is more 
data intensive, requiring yearly panel data on workplaces and their workers, together with changes 
in union density and employment.  Using workplace fixed effects we are able to account for the 
possibility that workplaces will permanently differ in their demand for labour.  Using first 
differences on unionisation and other explanatory variables we are able to account for omitted 
variables bias which is likely to affect estimates of growth which rely solely on the measurement 
of conditioning variables in the base period. This omitted variable bias arising from failure to 
account for shifts in unionisation and the other exogenous variables is negative if shifts in 
unionisation and the other exogenous variables are negatively correlated with the final period 
employment.26 We are also able to use lagged variables and union membership fees to account 
for the potential endogeneity of unionisation.  Finally, this modelling framework allows us to 
distinguish between unions’ effects on short-term and long-term employment adjustments, 
whereas the standard approach is capturing unions’ relationship to short-term adjustments only. 
These extensions to the standard modelling framework prove important.  Using the 
dynamic panel modelling approach we find unions have positive and statistically significant 
impacts on both short-run and long-run employment adjustments.  The effects are also 
quantitatively sizeable.  In the short-run a 1 percent rise in union density results in a 1.36 percent 
                                                 
26 For example, if workers seek union membership for protection when they anticipate bad times, then the omitted 
variable bias associated with unionisation may turn an otherwise positive relationship between unions and size into 
negative one. 
increase in employment.  In the long-term 1 percent higher union density implies 3.9 percent 
higher employment. 
These results suggest that, at least in the Norwegian case, the average causal impact of 
unions on employment growth is positive, not negative as might appear to be the case using 
standard modelling procedures. The standard results are biased by omitted variables. The 
dynamic panel approach also accounts for the possibility that workers join unions in anticipation 
of a decline in employment, something that would otherwise downwardly bias union effects on 
employment.  The reason why one might get positive union effects on employment growth in 
Norway is that, having controlled for wage effects as we do, centralised wage bargaining takes 
wages out of competition, allowing unions to focus on their voice and agency roles for the 
employer which can be of mutual benefit to both the firm and workers.  This is consistent with 
Teulings and Hartog’s (1998) proposition that rent-seeking is not unions’ primary objective in 
corporatist countries.27 It is also supportive of the notion of Cahuc et al. (2007) that firms 
strategic manipulation of wages through employment and capital decisions, may in some cases 
increase overall employment when the bargaining power of some worker groups increases (which 
is expressed in our empirical analyses through higher union density). 
We do not have adequate data to run the same exercise for Britain.  However, one may 
speculate first that, since the standard modelling approach uncovers no negative union impact on 
short-term employment adjustments, it is unlikely that they would emerge from a dynamic panel 
analysis.  On the other hand, fragmented wage bargaining may limit unions’ ability to offer 
positive productivity-enhancing voice and agency roles to employers, constraining their ability to 
affect employment positively.  In any event these findings indicate the need for caution when 
interpreting negative effects of unions on growth and survival in the literature as causal impacts 
of unionization. 
                                                 
27 They argue that ‘corporatist unions have fundamentally different incentives than unions in decentralized 
economies’ (Teulings and Hartog, 1998: 20). Thus corporatist unions renegotiate contracts to maximise the joint 
surplus of workers and employers, and not to maximise the workers’ share of the surplus.  
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Figure 1 5-digit SIC industry employment growth 1997-2003 and industry union density 1997 
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Table 1 Changes in Private Sector Unionisation, 1997/8-2003/4 
 UK Norway 
 1998 2004 1997 2003 
  
Workplaces  
Union recognition (%) 24.6 16.3 79.3 73.4 
No agreements (%) 75.3 83.5 31.7 36.3 
1 agreement (%) 20.0 11.4 37.9 31.6 
2 agreements (%) 2.7 3.5 14.7 16.9 
3 or more agreements (%) 2.0 1.6 15.5 15.2 
Union density (%-points)  10.7 8.7 37.3 37.2 
Individual wage determination (%) 91.6 91.6 31.1 26.6 
Centralised bargaining (%) 5.6 2.3 24.3 25.2 
Local bargaining (only or combined) (%) 11.0 8.4 44.5 48.2 
Bargaining, DK-level 8.3 5.5          -             - 
Closure (%)               18.7 17.4 
Log employment growth (%)              -0.2 -1.2 
  
Workers  
Union recognition (%) 41.7 32.6 86.0 81.3 
No agreements (%) 58.4 66.7 18.2 25.7 
1 agreement (%) 22.4 20.5 29.9 27.8 
2 agreements (%) 9.4 7.7 14.0 17.3 
3 or more agreements (%) 10.4 5.2 37.8 29.2 
Union density (%-points) 20.8 16.9 48.7 47.9 
Individual wage determination (%) 88.5 88.6 23.6 18.7 
Centralised bargaining (%) 6.3 5.1 19.7 21.9 
Local bargaining (only or combined) (%) 26.7 20.2 56.5 59.3 
Bargaining, DK-level 9.3 7.4 - - 
Note: Based on the British WERS 1998 and 2004, and the Norwegian NWERS 1997 and 2003. The figures are 
nationally representative for the population of workplaces with more than 10 employees. For the British figures note 
the following: (1) Union recognition and number of union agreements include cases where no recognition declared 
yet employer says collective bargaining occurs.  These cases are coded as ‘single recognised union’ for N agreements. 
(2) Individual wage determination is actually any wage determination other than collective bargaining. (3) Centralised 
bargaining and local bargaining are not mutually exclusive. In both cases variables identify workplaces with any 
incidence of that type of bargaining. Local bargaining is any workplace-level or organization level collective 
bargaining.  Also included ‘Bargaining but DK level’ because quite a big category in Britain. For the Norwegian 
figures note that union recognition and No agreements do not add to 100. The reason is that some of workplaces 
classified as recognising unions in 1997 were not asked the question regarding the number of agreements, but have 
their union recognition status defined according to whether wages were set by collective bargaining (either centrally 
or locally). For reasons of comparability, union recognition in 2003 is also defined as either having at least one 
agreement or being involved in collective wage bargaining. Note also that roughly 10 percentage points of the 
workplaces that individually set wages in 1997, have union agreements. This involves roughly 5 percentage points of 
the workers in 1997. 
 
 
Table 2. The Impact of union recognition on closures. Private sector. Probit regressions. 
Marginal effects.  
 UK Norway 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model6 Model 7 
Union recognition 0.055 0.039 0.020 -0.046 -0.043 -0.041 -0.019 
Missing union info. - - - -0.017 -0.029 -0.032 -0.100 
Age of workplace (ref.: 10+ 
years) 
       
Age <5 years 0.111** 0.082 0.081 0.219** 0.223*** 0.229*** 0.222*** 
5 =<Age<10 years 0.128*** 0.066 0.039 0.035** 0.038** 0.036** 0.036* 
Workplace size (ref: 500+ 
employees) 
       
11-24 employees 0.058 0.056 0.064 0.124*** 0.098* 0.096* 0.086 
25-49 employees 0.179*** 0.209*** 0.226*** 0.159*** 0.129* 0.126* 0.125* 
50-99 employees -0.029 -0.013 -0.006 0.055 0.039 0.035 0.030 
100-199 employees 0.023 0.017 -0.007 0.038 0.016 0.014 0.008 
200-499 employees -0.000 -0.016 -0.025 -0.012 -0.026 -0.028 -0.014 
Single workplace 0.018 -0.020 -0.022 0.012 0.017 0.020 0.015 
Log relative growth (t to t-1)  0.121** 0.126***  -0.076*** -0.073*** -0.068** 
Job cuts/laid off  0.075** 0.088**  0.137*** 0.140*** 0.131*** 
Recruitment problems  0.069** 0.071**  0.042*** 0.042*** 0.025*** 
Financial performance 
relative to industry average 
(ref.: a lot better than 
average) 
       
FP better than average  -0.024 -0.020  0.019 0.024 0.037 
FP average  0.105** 0.098*  -0.016 -0.012 0.012 
FP below average  -0.036 -0.066  0.024 0.026 0.050 
FP missing  0.136 0.028  0.088 0.088 0.085 
Merger  0.049 0.043  -0.017 -0.021 -0.035 
Sold-off/de-merger  -0.020 -0.029  0.027 0.030 0.043 
Strong competition  0.027 0.035  0.005 0.009 0.009 
Main market abroad  0.083 0.073  0.068* 0.073** 0.050 
S.CompXabroad  -0.024 -0.025  -0.083** -0.086** -0.078** 
Growing market  -0.013 -0.006  -0.026 -0.034 0.146* 
Male dominated  0.187*** 0.209***  -0.024 -0.015 -0.020 
Ind. rel. growth min. 
capital  
     -0.009**  
        
Controls for:        
Industry  (1-digit SIC) Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Industry (2-digit SIC)   Yes    Yes 
Regions (1-digit) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Main occupation (1-digit)  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
N(observations) 1488 1488 1488 1368 1368 1368 1368 
Note: Marginal effects calculated from Table A1. See Table A1 for further details. ***, ** and * denote 1, 5, and 10 
percent level of significance, respectively.  The regressions for Britain also include dummies for not trading,  missing 
lagged employment,  missing age information and for difference kinds of measure of financial performance (e.g., 
profits). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3. The Impact of unions on closures. Private sector. Probit. Marginal effects. 
 UK Norway 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model6 Model7 
Method: ML ML ML ML ML ML ML 
1):        
1 union agreement 0.068 0.056 0.041 -0.046 -0.044 -0.042 -0.040 
2 union agreements 0.128* 0.101 0.091 0.032 0.038 0.036 0.021 
3+ union agreements -0.134*** -0.121*** -0.116*** 0.053 0.059 0.064 0.055 
Missing data on N agree. -0.030 -0.080 -0.079 -0.076 -0.085 -0.088 -0.048 
Pseudo-R2 0.16 0.28 0.29 0.081 0.108 0.111 0.149 
2):        
Union density 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
Pseudo-R2 0.1496 0.2626 0.2784 0.072 0.098 0.102 0.142 
        
Controls for:        
Age, size, single unit Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Previous performance  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Competition  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (1-digit SIC) Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Industry (2-digit SIC)   Yes    Yes 
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Main occupation  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. rel. growth min. capital      Yes  
        
N(observations) 1490 1490 1490 1368 1368 1368 1368 
Note: Table elements express parameter estimates from 2 sets of regressions replicating the analysis of Table 2 – 
models 2 and 5 using 1) variables expressing the number of union agreements (no agreement reference), and 2) 
union density: Dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy for workplace closure during our period of 
observation. UK: end year=2004, start year=1998. Norway: end year=2003, start year=1997. ***, ** and * denote 1, 5, 
and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. The full regression results available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4. The importance of the position in the wage distribution for the impact of unions on 
closures. Private sector. Probit. Marginal effects. 
 UK Norway 
 Model 3 Model7 
Method: ML ML 
1):   
Union recognition-high wage -0.014 0.395* 
Union recognition-middle wage 0.013 -0.016 
Union recognition-low wage -0.045 -0.066 
Low wage 0.240*** 0.149 
High wage 0.050 -0.112*** 
   
Pseudo-R2  0.155 
2):   
Union density  -1.123** 
Union density X log average workplace daily wage  0.216** 
Log average workplace daily wage  -0.100** 
   
Pseudo-R2  0.150 
   
Controls for: Yes Yes 
Age, size, single unit   
Previous performance   
Competition Yes Yes 
Industry (2-digit SIC) Yes Yes 
Regions Yes Yes 
Main occupation Yes Yes 
   
N(observations) 1115 1368 
Note: Table elements express parameter estimates from 2 sets of regressions replicating the analysis of Table 2 – 
models 3 and 7 adding wage measures and cross-terms between wages and union for two union measures: 1) union 
recognition and 2) union density (Norway only). Dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy for workplace 
closure during our period of observation. UK: end year=2004, start year=1998. Norway: end year=2003, start 
year=1997. The full regression results available from the authors upon request. ***, ** and * denote 1, 5, and 10 
percent level of significance, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5. The impact of unions on growth. Private sector.  
 UK Norway 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Method: OLS OLS ML OLS OLS ML ML 
1):        
Union recognition 0.007 -0.004 -0.002 -0.032** -0.041*** -0.047*** -0.035*** 
Missing union info.        
R2 0.15 0.28  0.088 0.152   
Wald test indep. eqns. (rho=0): chi2(1)  0.03   43.01 0.00 
Rho-estimate   -0.143   -0.748*** 0.016 
        
2):        
1 union agreement 0.008 -0.002 -0.001 -0.026*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
2 union agreements 0.010 0.003 0.011 -0.044*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.055*** 
3+ union agreements -0.021 -0.043** -0.048 -0.017 -0.019 -0.020 -0.021 
        
R2 0.15 0.28  0.088 0.152   
Wald test indep. eqns. (rho=0): chi2(1)  0.13   43.01 0.08 
Rho-estimate   -0.312   -0.748*** 0.051 
        
3):        
Union density -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.043 -0.048** -0.048** -0.049*** 
R2 0.15 0.28  0.089 0.115   
Wald test indep. eqns. (rho=0): chi2(1)  0.02   0.04 0.10 
Rho-estimate   -0.084   0.035 0.050 
        
Controls for:        
Age, size, single unit Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Previous performance  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Competition  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (1-digit SIC) Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Industry (2-digit SIC)   Yes    Yes 
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Main occupation  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
       
N(observations) 957 957 1174 1161 1161 1368 1368 
Note: Table elements express parameter estimates from 2 sets of regressions replicating the analyses of tables 2 and 3 
on growth (instead of closure) using 1)variable measuring union recognition, 2) variables expressing the number of 
union agreements (no agreement reference), and 3) union density: Dependent variable in all regressions is log(Size 
end year/Size start year)/6. UK: end year=2004, start year=1998. Norway: end year=2003, start year=1997. Models 
3, 6and 7 are estimated using Stata’s Heckman-procedure, i.e., maximum likelihood jointly with a selection equation. 
The full regression results available from the authors upon request. Table A2 shows the full results for case 1) Union 
recognition.  ***, ** and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent level of significance, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6. The impact of union agreements on categories of growth. Private sector.  
Generalized ordered Probit. Marginal effects. 
 UK Norway 
 -0.25>G 0>G≥-0.25 0.25>G≥0 G≥0.25 -0.25>G 0>G≥-0.25 0.25>G≥0 G≥0.25
1 union agreement -0.028 -0.008 0.003 0.034 0.107*** -0.076*** 0.023 -0.054***
 (0.057) (0.017) (0.004) (0.070) (0.028) (0.026) (0.042) (0.025) 
2 union agreements 0.007 0.002 -0.001 -0.008 0.034 0.068*** 0.038 -0.140***
 (0.064) (0.015) (0.007) (0.072) (0.037) (0.018) (0.036) (0.035) 
3+ union agreements 0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.046** 0.006** -0.016* -0.037***
 (0.106) (0.026) (0.011) (0.121) (0.023) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) 
         
Controls for:         
Age, size, single unit Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (1-digit SIC) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.117 0.055 
N(observations) 944 1161 
Note: Table elements show the estimated marginal effect on the growth category probabilities (these are denoted by 
the column headings). G denotes log employment growth, which is calculated log(Size end year/Size start year)/6. 
UK: end year=2004, start year=1998. Norway: end year=2003, start year=1997..  Table A3 reports the estimated 
parameters and standard errors of the model for UK and Norway. Dependent variable in the two regressions 
expresses the category, taking the value of 1 (-0.25>G) to 4 (G≥0.25).  The control variables are otherwise identical to Table 
3’s Model 1(4)-case 1). Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent level of 
significance, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 7 The impact of changes in union density on employment growth 
 Growth annualised Annual growth 
 UK Norway Norway 
Population-weighted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
∆union densityt -0.000 0.181 0.207** 0.213*** 0.184 4.185** 0.653*** 4.178*** 
 (0.002) (0.139) (0.103) (0.083) (0.148) (2.076) (0.213) (1.173) 
∆log average waget    0.069 0.075 0.003 0.145 0.054 
    (0.083) (0.046) (0.043) (0.112) (0.121) 
∆single_unitt -0.031 0.130*** 0.251*** 0.183*** 0.134*** 0.146*** 0.057 0.086** 
 (0.059) (0.052) (0.054) (0.035) (0.046) (0.033) (0.037) (0.044) 
         
Controls for:         
Year dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV      Yes  Yes 
First step test for excl. 
instrument, F-value 
     6.850  13.06 
Cragg-Donald weak 
instrument test, F-value 
     5.689  19.92 
Andersen canon.corr. LR-
test, P-value 
     0.017  0.001 
Population 98/04 97/03 97/03 97/03 97- 97- 97- 97- 
F (workp.)/N(obser.) 572/ 
572 
1186/ 
1186 
1186/ 
5848 
1186/ 
5848 
1324/ 
6088 
1324/ 
6088 
1324/ 
6088 
1324/ 
6088 
Note: Columns headed by Growth annualised present the result from analyses where the dependent variable denotes 
log employment growth, which is calculated log(Size end year/Size start year)/6. UK: end year=2004, start 
year=1998. Norway: end year=2003, start year=1997. Columns headed by Annual growth present the result from 
analyses where the dependent variable denotes log employment growth, which is calculated log(Size year t/Size year 
t-1). In Models 1-6 each observation is weighted according to the 1997(1998)-sampling probability. Estimation 
method: Models 1-5 and 7: First-difference OLS, Model 6 and 8: First-difference IV/GMM regression., Population: 
98-04 denotes private sector UK workplaces participating in WERS1998 surviving to 2004, 97-03 denotes private 
sector Norwegian workplaces participating in NWERS 1997 surviving to 2003, and 97- denotes private sector 
Norwegian workplaces participating in NWERS 1997, surviving at least to 1999 (maximum period of observation 
until 2003). Instruments: Models 6 and 8: workplace average union membership fee as instrument for union density, 
All regressions also incorporate an intercept term. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote 
1, 5, and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 8 The impact of union density on log annual workforce employment. Norway 
Estimation method OLS OLS-Within System-GMM 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
union densityt 0.677*** 0.471** 1.364*** 
 (0.208) (0.208) (0.430) 
log average waget 0.209* 0.127 -0.035 
 (0.111) (0.129) (0.253) 
single_unitt 0.068* 0.091** -0.496** 
 (0.039) (0.044) (0.249) 
square root of aget 0.980*** 0.374 2.076* 
 (0.362) (1.869) (1.138) 
log workforce sizet-1 0.946*** 0.319*** 0.894*** 
 (0.008) (0.051) (0.041) 
union densityt-1 -0.677*** -0.246* -0.954** 
 (0.201) (0.145) (0.395) 
log average wage t-1 0.212* -0.351*** 0.006 
 (0.111) (0.089) (0.184) 
single_unit t-1 -0.077** -0.066 -0.496** 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.249) 
square root of age t-1 -0.945*** -0.476 -1.994 
 (0.351) (1.601) (1.097) 
Selected structural parameters of interest    
γ1 240.737 1.422* 0.354** 
γ2 0.054*** 0.681*** 0.106*** 
βu 0.003 0.331 3.853** 
βw -0.045 -0.329* -3.282* 
    
Controls for:    
Year dummies, intercept Yes Yes Yes 
    
Hansen test of overid. Restrictions, P-value   0.230 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences   0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences   0.452 
Population 97- 97- 97- 
F (workp.)/N(obser.) 1324/6088 1324/6088 1324/6088 
Note: Columns heading denotes estimation method. The dependent variable denotes log workforce size year t. In 
Population: 97- denotes private sector Norwegian workplaces participating in NWERS 1997, surviving at least to 
1999 (maximum period of observation until 2003). Instruments: Model 3: lagged variables of all variables + 
workplace average union membership fee (see text). All regressions also incorporate an intercept term. Robust 
standard errors reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. 
 Appendix  
Table A1. The Impact of union recognition on closures. Private sector. Probit regressions. 
 UK Norway 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Union recognition 0.224 0.184 0.102 -0.186 -0.180 -0.174 -0.087 
 (1.12) (1.01) (0.55) (0.220) (0.249) (0.253) (0.255) 
Missing union info. - - - -0.074 -0.137 -0.154 -0.702 
 - - - (0.340) (0.301) (0.311) (0.830) 
Age <5 years 0.410* 0.351 0.358 0.723*** 0.746*** 0.765*** 0.764*** 
 (1.96)  (1.57) (1.56) (0.263) (0.232) (0.220) (0.209) 
5 =<Age<10 years 0.479** 0.297* 0.189 0.142** 0.159*** 0.150*** 0.156* 
 (2.57)  (1.61)  (0.99) (0.062) (0.060) (0.056) (0.085) 
Missing age info. 0.086 0.159 0.311 - - - - 
 (0.23) (0.47) (0.94) - - - - 
11-24 employees 0.257 0.287 0.344 0.567*** 0.455* 0.449* 0.415 
 (1.10) (1.22) (1.32) (0.115) (0.259) (0.265) (0.319) 
25-49 employees 0.646*** 0.810*** 0.889*** 0.583*** 0.494*** 0.486** 0.498** 
 (2.83)  (3.60)  (3.44)  (0.129) (0.214) (0.219) (0.234) 
50-99 employees -0.131 -0.067 -0.033 0.216 0.163 0.147 0.129 
 (0.60) (0.29) (0.13) (0.183) (0.292) (0.295) (0.306) 
100-199 employees 0.093 0.081 -0.036 0.150 0.070 0.058 0.037 
 (0.47) (0.38) (0.14) (0.119) (0.151) (0.154) (0.213) 
200-499 employees -0.002 -0.083 -0.139 -0.054 -0.122 -0.133 -0.069 
 (0.01) (0.37) (0.53) (0.130) (0.193) (0.194) (0.207) 
Single workplace 0.076 -0.102 -0.117 0.050 0.076 0.088 0.072 
 (0.42) (0.61) (0.63) (0.063) (0.097) (0.090) (0.081) 
Log relative growth t  0.599*** 0.653***  -0.333*** -0.321*** -0.315** 
  (2.60)  (2.77)   (0.111) (0.113) (0.132) 
Missing lagged info.  0.460 0.533  - - - 
  (1.21) (1.47)  - - - 
Job cuts/laid off  0.337** 0.406**  0.497*** 0.509*** 0.495*** 
  (1.96)  (2.38)   (0.113) (0.114) (0.107) 
Recruitment problems  0.340** 0.364**  0.189*** 0.190*** 0.117*** 
  (2.33)  (2.50)   (0.060) (0.057) (0.040) 
FP better than average  -0.123 -0.108  0.081 0.100 0.158 
  (0.54) (0.46)  (0.077) (0.070) (0.184) 
FP average  0.473*** 0.460*  -0.073 -0.055 -0.056 
  (2.02)  (1.93)   (0.357) (0.359) (0.541) 
FP below average  -0.196 -0.431  0.102 0.109 0.212 
  (0.57) (1.18)  (0.212) (0.208) (0.317) 
FP missing  0.541 0.137  0.437 0.440 0.444 
  (1.33) (0.32)  (1.009) (1.011) (1.008) 
Sales, fees or budget  -0.180 -0.189     
  (0.86) (0.96)     
Costs/expenditure  0.109 0.309     
  (0.37) (1.03)     
Stock Market indicator  -0.575 -0.273     
  (1.47) (0.65)     
Other  -0.322 0.042     
  (0.97) (0.12)     
Merger  0.217 0.199  -0.078 -0.094 -0.169 
  (0.80) (0.70)  (0.237) (0.242) (0.236) 
Sold-off/de-merger  -0.108 -0.164  0.115 0.124 0.184** 
  (0.34) (0.48)  (0.089) (0.089) (0.083) 
Strong competition  0.132 0.141  0.023 0.039 0.043 
  (0.65) (0.57)  (0.092) (0.089) (0.091) 
Main market abroad  0.357 0.176  0.269** 0.286*** 0.209 
  (1.20) (1.90)  (0.132) (0.121) (0.178) 
S.CompXabroad  -0.127 -0.138  -0.453* -0.479* -0.455 
  (0.33) (0.32)  (0.253) (0.252) (0.289) 
Growing market  -0.065 -0.031  -0.111 -0.147 -0.741** 
   (0.40) (0.19)  (0.217) (0.211) (0.363) 
Male dominated  0.717*** 0.805***  -0.108 -0.069 -0.094 
  (2.77)  (3.25)   (0.090) (0.106) (0.095) 
Ind. rel. growth min. capital       -0.042***  
      (0.015)  
Constant -0.680 ** -1.895** -1.746** -1.061*** -1.264*** -1.201*** -7.881*** 
 (2.67) (4.55)  (3.10)  (0.2251) (0.245) (0.219) (0.901) 
        
Controls for:        
Industry (1-digit SIC) Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Industry (2-digit SIC)   Yes    Yes 
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Main occupation  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.15 0.26 0.28 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.14 
N(observations) 1488 1488 1429 1368 1368 1368 1325 
Note: Log relative growth t measures log relative workforce growth from period t-1 to t  (UK: t=1998, 
Norway:t=1997). FP denotes financial performance. Norway: Industry relative growth minimum capital expresses 
industry average (2-digit SIC) of relative growth in minimum capital values related to buildings for newly started 
firms per employee from 1994-95 to 1996-97. Robust standard errors are denoted in parentheses. Due to the 
stratified sampling, each observation is weighted according to the inverse sampling probability. In the Norwegian 
case, due to the sampling procedure the standard errors are corrected for clustering on the strata-variable.  ***, *** and 
*** denote 1, 5, and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table A2. The Impact of union recognition on growth. Private sector.  
 UK Norway 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Method: OLS OLS ML OLS OLS ML  
Union recognition 0.007 -0.004 -0.002 -0.032** -0.041*** -0.047*** -0.035*** 
 (0.46) (0.26) (0.15) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.006) 
Missing union info. - - - -0.019 -0.037 -0.041 -0.047 
 - - - (0.026) (0.035) (0.028) (0.036) 
Age of workplace (ref.: 10+ 
years) 
       
Age <5 years 0.017 0.011 0.009 0.025* 0.029 0.056*** 0.024 
 (1.00) (0.69) (0.44) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.029) 
5 =<Age<10 years -0.009 -0.019 -0.015 0.015*** 0.009 0.015*** 0.007 
 (0.50) (1.14) (0.79) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Workplace size (ref: 500+ 
employees) 
       
11-24 employees 0.035 0.038 0.048 0.099*** 0.103*** 0.117*** 0.098*** 
 (1.51) (1.69) (1.99)** (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
25-49 employees 0.027 0.031 0.035 0.066*** 0.072*** 0.091*** 0.075*** 
 (1.26) (1.48) (1.21) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
50-99 employees 0.032 0.035 0.036 0.056*** 0.0620*** 0.077*** 0.074*** 
 (1.57) (1.66) (1.77) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) 
100-199 employees 0.002 0.008 0.008 0.045* 0.047*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 
 (0.10) (0.36) (0.38) (0.020) (0.010) (0.018) (0.020) 
200-499 employees 0.027 0.025 0.031 0.037*** -0.016*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 
 (1.51) (1.29) (1.61) (0.009) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) 
Single workplace -0.007 -0.014 0.001 -0.018** -0.057** -0.015** -0.012** 
 (0.50) (1.20) (0.08) (0.006) (0.023) (0.006) (0.005) 
Log relative growth  -0.016 -0.005  -0.061*** -0.079*** -0.061*** 
  (1.16) (0.38)  (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
Job cuts/laid off  0.009 0.012  -0.057** -0.035 -0.056 
  (0.78) (0.73)  (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) 
Recruitment problems  -0.003 -0.003  -0.006 -0.000 -0.004 
  (0.21) (0.20)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Financial performance 
relative to industry average 
(ref.: a lot better than 
average) 
       
FP better than average  0.021 0.013  0.013 0.018 0.012 
  (1.16) (0.72)  (0.017) (0.014) (0.018) 
FP average  -0.015 -0.014  -0.016 -0.018 -0.003 
  (0.76) (0.65)  (0.018) (0.025) (0.012) 
FP below average  0.009 0.018  -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.25) (0.41)  (0.028) (0.029) (0.026) 
FP missing  -0.028 -0.033  0.102** 0.113** 0.088** 
  (0.90) (1.01)  (0.041) (0.052) (0.043) 
Merger  -0.004 -0.008  -0.008 -0.009 -0.005 
  (0.23) (0.42)  (0.017) (0.009) (0.019) 
Sold-off/de-merger  -0.072** -0.069*  0.009 0.013 0.007 
  (2.09) (1.87)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) 
Strong competition  0.007 0.009  0.008 0.008 0.011 
  (0.44) (0.63)  (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) 
Main market abroad  -0.038* -0.020  -0.025* -0.015 -0.029** 
  (1.64) (0.74)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
S.CompXabroad  0.053** 0.028  0.016 0.002 0.021 
  (1.96) (0.94)  (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) 
Growing market  0.023** 0.033**  0.006 0.004 0.014 
  (1.96) (2.65)  (0.013) (0.016) (0.022) 
Male dominated  0.051*** 0.045  0.024** 0.018 0.022 
  (3.51) (1.52)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
Controls for:        
 Industry (1-digit SIC) Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Industry (2-digit SIC)   Yes    Yes 
Regions (1-digit) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Main occupations (1-digit)  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.15 0.28  0.088 0.152   
Wald test indep. eqns. (rho=0):chi2(1)  0.03   43.01 0.00 
Rho-estimate  -0.143   -0.748*** 0.016 
N(observations) 956 956 1174 1161 1161 1368 1368 
Note: Dependent variable is log(Size end year/Size start year)/6. In Britain the denominator is 6.3 which is the 
median gap between survey interviews. UK: end year=2004, start year=1998. Norway: end year=2003, start 
year=1997. Models 3 and 6 are estimated using Stata’s Heckman-procedure, i.e., maximum likelihood jointly with a 
selection equation. The selection equation is identical to Models 3 and 6 in Table A1. An intercept is included in all 
regressions. In regressions for Britain a dummy for not trading, a dummy for missing lagged employment, a dummy 
for missing age information and dummies for difference kinds of measure of financial performance (e.g., profits) are 
also included. Robust standard errors are denoted in parentheses. Due to the stratified sampling, each observation is 
weighted according to the inverse sampling probability. In the Norwegian case, due to the sampling procedure the 
standard errors are corrected for clustering on the strata-variable.  ***, *** and *** denote 1, 5, and 10 percent level of 
significance, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table A3 The impact of union agreements on categories of growth. Private sector.  
Generalized Ordered Probit.  
 UK Norway 
 -0.25>G 0>G≥-0.25 0.25>G≥0 -0.25>G 0>G≥-0.25 0.25>G≥0  
1 union agreement 0.091 0.091 0.091 -0.309*** -0.078 -0.192**  
 (0.186) (0.186) (0.186) (0.086) (0.071) (0.091)  
2 union agreements -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.098 -0.258*** -0.589***  
 (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.103) (0.062) (0.180)  
3+ union agreements -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.133** -0.133** -0.133**  
 (0.331) (0.331) (0.331) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)  
        
Controls for:        
Age, size, single unit Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry (1-digit SIC) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Pseudo-R2 0.116 0.055 
N(observations) 944 1161 
Note: Table elements show the estimated parameters and standard errors of generalized ordered Probit regressions. l 
The column headings denote the growth categories. G denotes log employment growth, which is calculated log(Size 
end year/Size start year)/6. UK: end year=2004, start year=1998. Norway: end year=2003, start year=1997. 
Dependent variable in the two regressions expresses the category, taking the value of 1 (-0.25>G) to 4 (G≥0.25). Note 
that the estimates are measured relative to category 4 (G≥0.25), which thus acts as a reference category. Note also that equal 
parameter estimate in each of the categories are imposed if not rejected. For the UK-estimates the equal parameter assumption 
were not rejected. The full regression results available from the authors upon request. Robust standard errors reported 
in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. 
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